BACKGROUND TO THE WAR ON IRAQ

The current US administration and indeed the governments of its “coalition” allies including the UK have offered four key justifications for their invasion of Iraq. They are:

• To spare the people of Iraq from further suffering resulting from an oppressive, brutal dictatorship

• To rid the region of weapons of mass destruction under development by Saddam Hussein as called for by various UN resolutions

• To install free democracy within Iraq and ultimately the surrounding region for the benefit of the people.

• To sever connections between Saddam Hussein (and his weaponry) and international terrorist groups of threat to the West.

These justifications fail to withstand the most basic scrutiny.

The first aim may be desirable but is shown to be insincere in the light of the extensive and well-documented support that the UK and the US have given to Saddam Hussein over preceding decades, especially when it was convenient to those countries’ political interests (such as during Western opposition to the Iranian regime when the US and UK welcomed and indeed helped arm Saddam Hussein’s conflict with that country). Not only that, 12 years of sanctions subsequently imposed on Iraq have had disastrous humanitarian consequences and are said to be responsible for thousands of deaths and untold human suffering, compounded by the aftermath of previous US/UK attacks on the country. The United Nations Children’s Fund documented an increase in the under-five child mortality rate in Iraq from 56 to 131 per thousand in the sanction years 1990-1998, with an estimated child death toll of several hundred thousand, although there is fierce debate over who is to blame for these additional deaths. Whatever the details there is a clear indication that US policies tend not to be based on regard for the people of Iraq, however true it is that the people may wish themselves rid of their leader.

The second point collapses, as a last-resort justification for invasion, on examination of the considerable remaining doubt that Saddam Hussein actually has at his disposal (or had, prior to this war), sufficient numbers of WMD with which to intimidate other nations. Expert opinion has suggested that this is unlikely, and indeed little evidence has as yet emerged of WMD arsenals in Iraq. Nonetheless, it would be naïve to deny that Saddam Hussein has both the will and the capability to produce and use chemical and biological weapons and perhaps nuclear weapons as well, even if there is uncertainty as to what extent this may have occurred. Such a suggestion needs to be addressed, as do such developments in other countries. But history suggests that UN-approved weapons inspections offer an effective means of eliminating stocks of WMD and containing their development. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter’s book War On Iraq (Ritter and William Rivers Pitt, Profile Books, 2002), describes his belief that Iraq has already once been “fundamentally disarmed” by means of this approach, apparently with 90-95% of its weapons of mass destruction eliminated. Of nuclear weapons capability, for example, Ritter says: “When I left Iraq in 1998... the infrastructure and facilities had been 100% eliminated. There’s no doubt about that. All of their instruments and facilities had been destroyed” (p.26). There is no legitimate reason that weapons inspections could not have been continued on this occasion.

As for the third point: it is possible to argue that, from a moral perspective, bringing a democratic regime into being in Iraq would be a good thing, from the perspective not only of human rights in Iraq but also of human rights in the rest of the Arab world. While this may be true, the argument in its favour is an over-simplification. There is much potential for the reverse to happen, i.e. for this action to result in increased Arab hostility to the West because of the imposition of a Western-friendly regime on Iraq. The well-meaning intentions claimed by this objective also look weak upon examination of the details of the current US foreign policy, which are clearly geared to self-interest (see more below). In addition, consideration must be given to the chaos that ensues when “power vacuums” remain after conflict in politically and ethnically divided countries, especially given the diverse and already divided composition of Iraq’s people. There is much doubt that the US has the will to follow the plan through for the years it would take to ensure a functioning democracy. The outcome of similar military campaigns and claims does not bode well; for example in Afghanistan there is continuing instability more than a year after the main conflict, with warlords in control of much of the west of the country, a low-intensity civil war continuing to this day, and ongoing cases of appalling human rights abuses, poverty and deprivation.

Evidence for the fourth point has already been scoffed at by the mainstream media, which revealed dossiers on Al Qaida’s links with Iraq to be of no merit whatsoever. As Scott Ritter points out (War on Iraq [see above], pp. 45 and 47), the Iraqis have laws providing for “an immediate death sentence for proselytizing in the name of Wahabbism, …; which is of course Osama Bin Laden’s religion.” If Iraq gave Al Qaida weapons of mass destruction, Al Qaida would probably use them against Saddam Hussein.

It is inevitable that such an obviously dubious set of justifications, delivered by the authorities at different times with an apparent view to securing favourable public opinion, will cause observers of this war to feel confusion and frustration about the real motives behind it. Close scrutiny of a number of US policy documents brings some illumination, however, as outlined next, in Underlying Motives and Objectives.