The US - Russian Nuclear Arms Treaty
(from SGR Newsletter 25, May 2002)

Stuart Parkinson asks whether the treaty is a major step in disarmament or just a public relations exercise.

On May 23rd 2002 Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the US and the Russia. Hailed by the Americans as marking a 'new-era' in relations between the two countries, it commits them both to reduce their current arsenals of strategic nuclear warheads from around 6000 each down to between 1700 and 2200 each by 2012 (US Dept of State, 2002).

Should we celebrate this apparently very positive agreement? Here's eight reasons to be deeply concerned...

1. Even 3400 strategic nuclear warheads are still enough to end civilisation as know it. It only requires the detonation of a few hundred nuclear warheads to cause a nuclear winter (Sagan, 1983). The target levels agreed are still unjustifiably excessive.
2. The weapons taken off active service can simply be stored, rather than destroyed. The process of storing weapons simply involves separating the warhead from the delivery vehicle (e.g. ballistic missile) and storing them separately. This allows either country to rearm quickly should circumstances allow. Such a procedure is all the more dangerous in the case of Russia, as the storage arrangements for its stockpile of fissile material (currently estimated at enough for 40,000 warheads) are less than secure (Luongo & Davis, 2002). Expanding this stockpile will further increase the possibility that other states or even well-organised terrorist groups could gain access.
3. Only strategic nuclear weapons, and not tactical ones, are covered by the agreement. Strategic, i.e. long-range, nuclear weapons are only part of the story. Both sides have large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, i.e. short-range and often of lower yield (also known as 'battlefield' nuclear weapons). The USA has approximately 1000 of these, whereas Russia has anywhere between 4000 and 12000 weapons - the exact number is not known (Luongo & Davis, 2002). Why haven't these been included the agreement, especially since even conservative estimates suggest that Russia has a major numbers advantage? It all seems to come down to the USA's recent 'Nuclear Posture Review' (NPR) which called for the USA to have a smaller, more flexible nuclear arsenal. The US thinking is that they should develop a new set of nuclear weapons with lower yields and higher penetrative power (so-called 'bunker-busters'), which could be used against targets such as underground bunkers or caves (Krieger, 2002). Meanwhile, Russia's current stockpile of active tactical nuclear weapons remains a target for theft by terrorist groups. The possibility of limited nuclear battles is becoming much more of a risk.
4. The existing weapons will remain on hair-trigger alert. With no agreement on de-alerting nuclear weapons arsenals, the possibility of accidental full-scale nuclear war remains - with the aging Russian arsenal being of particular concern.
5. The target levels apply only to 2012 - there are no intermediate reduction targets. Both countries could do little for several years without being in breach of the treaty...
6. Only 90 days notice of withdrawal may be given.
   ...and then, if political circumstances change, withdraw after three months without having taken significant action.
7. Either signatory is allowed to return to any force level it desires after ten years. In light of the agreement to allow weapons storage, major re-armament is again allowed, despite both countries' commitments to completely eliminate nuclear weapons made under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty.
8. The treaty puts no restrictions on the development of 'missile shields'. The agreement thus allows for the USA to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and continue with its development of 'National Missile Defence', including space weapons. This will, of course, do nothing to avert the current terrorists threats, may cause an arms race with China, and waste billions of dollars which could be spent on tackling poverty and environmental problems.

At best, this treaty is only a very small step in arms control and, bizarrely given the current international situation, may actually increase the threat of nuclear terrorism due to use of the 'storage' option for weapons, especially by Russia. Further, by leaving the issue of tactical nuclear weapons out of this agreement, it seems that the day when nuclear battles are fought has just got one step closer.

References and further reading

Krieger D. (2002) Nuclear Dangers Remain After Bush-Putin Agreement. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. http://www.napf.org/articles/02.05/0515kriegerbushputin.htm

Luongo K. & Davis I. (2002) Bush-Putin Summit Fails to Bury the Cold War. British American Security Information Council. Note, 22 May. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2002bush-putin.htm

Sagan, Carl (1983) The Nuclear Winter. Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Boston, MA.

US Dept of State (2002) Arms Treaty Marks New Era in U.S.-Russia Relations. Background briefing, 13 May. http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/02051309.htm

The text of the treaty is at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/issues/nuclearweapons/sortreaty.htm