US Policy Responsible for Nuclear Proliferation

John Moore

There is increasing international concern that America's controversial missile defence policy, a counter proliferation policy, may lead to the further proliferation of missile and nuclear weapon capabilities to more countries - the very developments the policy is designed to counter. It is likely that Russia and/or China will modify or expand their strategic nuclear missile systems to have the capability of penetrating a United States missile defence shield; and, like India and Pakistan, hitherto non-nuclear weapon states may perceive from these developments that nuclear weapons still have some value. So the post-Cold War gains of nuclear arsenal reductions, made during the 1990s, are likely to be slowed or even reversed.

In respect of treaty commitments, these gains are already looking fragile. President Bush has indicated that, in order to be free to explore the development of a wide range of missile defence systems, the United States will, at some time, revoke its Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with Russia. This will have knock-on effects on other nuclear arms control understandings with Russia. In particular, ratification of the START 2 treaty by the Russian Duma in 2000 was made contingent upon American ratification of agreements limiting missile defence systems; and neither President Bush nor the Congress are in any mood to ratify arms control agreements made during the Clinton administration, as seen by the US Senate's decision in 1999 not to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Nevertheless, the US administration has stated that it does not intend resuming nuclear weapon tests; although it does have a "Stockpile Stewardship Program" designed to keep its weapons "in good working order". All other nuclear weapon states have agreed to be bound by the CTBT; and India and Pakistan are currently observing their own moratoria on nuclear testing. Not being able to test their weapons is thought to be a major constraint on the ability of nuclear weapon states to design new weapons. The CTBT is thus considered to be an instrument limiting "vertical" proliferation, as well as the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries.

However, closer examination of American developments during the 1990s - the Clinton era - show that, despite perceived gains made in nuclear arms control, the decade did see further (vertical) US nuclear proliferation in terms of new weapon designs and new posited uses for nuclear weapons. These changes seem likely to quicken rather than be retarded under Bush's presidency, although it is also likely that the United States will make further numerical cuts in its vast nuclear arsenal, a relic of the Cold War.

These qualitative "improvements" in America's nuclear weapons were initiated after the end of the Cold War, when defence planners began looking for new scenarios under which nuclear weapons could be used. US nuclear weapons researchers began exploring the use of small nuclear explosives for destroying hardened underground targets and/or chemical and biological weapon manufacturing facilities or storage depots. The most significant product of this research into "mini-nukes" is the B61-11 warhead. In 1994 Congress enacted legislation limiting such research, but loopholes were left allowing for modification of existing warheads.

In 1996, against Iraq, and 1998, against Libya, US defence department officials hinted at the possible use of the B61-11 warhead against underground chemical or biological weapon plants or stocks. Although both the 1996 and 1998 threats were later disavowed, or "clarified", in essence the damage had been done; and arguably the pattern of threat and retraction is itself a tactic, part of the intentional ambiguity of US nuclear weapons policy. The stated policy, reaffirmed during the 2000 Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, is that American nuclear weapons would only be used against another nuclear weapon state (NWS) or a state in alliance with a NWS; but ambiguous statements made during the 1991 "Desert Storm" war with Iraq and subsequently suggest that America may walk away from this undertaking, just as it is abandoning its treaty obligations.

These developments in America's nuclear weapons technology and doctrine may be summarised by quoting from a recent paper by Andrew M Lichterman¹ :

The end result may be a multipolar arms race of unprecedented complexity, with the US deploying an array of exotic new "conventional" weapons, along with a smaller, modernized nuclear arsenal on long-range, more accurate, and stealthier delivery systems, with a number of other nations resuming or intensifying weapons development in an effort to keep up …other militaries will demand expanded weapons programs to offset the possibility of an insurmountable US advantage, and the conditions for a renewed arms race are in place. The continued pursuit of high-tech military dominance by the United States also provides the militaries of a number of other states with arguments for either keeping or obtaining weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. The modernization of enormous post-Cold War nuclear forces by a state whose wealth and power dwarfs all others legitimates nuclear weapons as instruments of state power and prestige, and provides a model for others to emulate … the militaries of states which the US views as adversaries, facing the continued refinement of long-range, stand-off weapons which appear to be lowering the political costs of violence to the United States and increasing US willingness to use force, may perhaps see weapons of mass destruction as a cheap "equalizer". This would in turn fulfil the prophecies of Pentagon contingency planners who then can argue for yet more "counterproliferation" weapons, whether conventional or nuclear.

Within this broader context, it is clear that US programs aimed at developing low-yield nuclear weapons concepts make the world less safe, not more. Researching ways to use nuclear weapons against chemical and biological weapons systems, command and control facilities, and other targets, manifests a dangerous drift towards a lower threshold of nuclear weapons use, including possible use against states without nuclear weapons. These efforts also make disarmament efforts far more difficult by calling into question the sincerity of the US commitment to its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty obligation …

References

[1] "Looking For New Ways to Use Nuclear Weapons: US Counterproliferation Programs, Weapons Effects Research, and 'Mini-Nuke' Development", Western States Legal Foundation Information Bulletin, Winter 2001, pp10-11. This article relies heavily on this paper.

The author: John Moore is a Lecturer in Mathematics at Leeds College of Technology and an SGR member. His article first appeared in SGR Newsletter No. 24 in March 2002.