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Much of this newsletter (NL19) concerns itself with the “everpresent danger” of nuclear emissions from reactors. However, much of the reason for nuclear power in the first place – as Ross Hesketh’s piece makes clear – was the drive to produce nuclear material for nuclear weapons.
This article is intended as a short update on the current state of play vis-à-vis weapons.
According to the reputable US Brookings Institute http://www.brook.edu/ current global stocks of nuclear weapons are:
There are also just under 15,000 inactive but intact US and Russian nuclear warheads which await destruction.
US strategic 9,170 US non-strategic 1,225 Russian strategic 7,622 Russian non-strat. 5,100 UK 260 France 450 China 400 Israel 100-150?
India and Pakistan are building their capability - as demonstrated by recent tests. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) call them de facto nuclear weapon states. In Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, Albrecht et al, identify Iran, Algeria, South Korea and Taiwan as "countries of concern", and have chapters devoted to Iraq and North Korea, whilst Argentina, Brazil and South Africa are seen as "backing away" from nuclear weapons. South Africa used to have 6 nuclear weapons which have now been dismantled.
Right now states of nuclear alert are low. Nevertheless some 16 nuclear powered and nuclear armed submarines are currently on patrol, whilst NATO has moved to a more flexible nuclear response. One UK Trident submarine can hit 48 targets with a 100kT warhead, range 7,400 km.
A "Nuclear Winter" threshold level of nuclear use is around 100 - 500 warheads, particularly if they are targetted at high carbon targets such as oil installations or coal storage areas. Nuclear Winter is the term for a prolonged period of cold and dark after nuclear war due to large amounts of carbon particulate aerosols being injected high into the atmosphere.
So, on this basis the current "overkill" ratio is at least 20.
A similar number of nuclear warheads to that which could trigger a nuclear winter is a potential "Star Wars" or SDI type capability threshold. Or, in other words, in the minds of its proponents, a strategic defence system might possibly cope with up to a few hundred warheads.
These types of thresholds have prompted SDI advocates to argue that if the US and Russia reduced their warhead numbers to near 100 - 200 that a) an SDI would then nullify any remaining deterrent effect - so a reason NOT to reduce this far; or b) the need for an SDI anyway to guarantee against "rogue" nuclear states (not meaning the current nuclear club of course) or accidental use.
BASIC thinks that around 200 US nuclear weapons are currently based in Europe.
NATO's new military strategy, MC400/1, approved at the North Atlantic Council meeting on June 3rd, 1996 commits the alliance to maintain a reduced, but more flexible nuclear posture for the foreseeable future. MC 400/1 does not revoke NATO's long-standing policy of keeping the "first use" option open. It does not commit NATO to use nuclear weapons only as a last resort. While the main purpose of nuclear weapons is said to be political, nuclear weapons are described as playing an essential stabilizing role in Europe, guarding against uncertainties (such as risks resulting from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and as serving as a hedge, in case a substantial military threat to NATO re-emerges.
NATO no longer maintains detailed nuclear war plans for the use of sub-strategic and/or strategic nuclear weapons in specific scenarios. Instead it has an "adaptive targeting capability", allowing senior NATO commanders to develop targeting and nuclear weapons employment plans at short notice during contingency or crisis from pre-existing databases on possible targets. NATO has also reduced the number of fully-trained dual capable aircraft (DCA) units ready to conduct nuclear missions in peacetime. Instead, the ability to deploy such aircraft from one NATO region to another has been increased. In peacetime each NATO country operating dual capable aircraft is required to maintain only one unit fully trained and ready for nuclear missions.
NATO's nuclear warfighting capability is strongly supported by a parallel modernization program for nuclear weapons storage sites on NATO airbases. In 1987 the U.S., and then NATO, decided to install "Weapons Storage and Security Systems (WS3) on all major European airbases. These storage systems allow for nuclear weapons to be deployed underneath nuclear certified aircraft within vaults constructed into the floor of “hardened” aircraft shelters. The system is said to protect the weapons against physical intrusion for a minimum of 30 minutes (by this is meant serious armed and violent intrusion involving high explosives – not someone kicking a door down!) and to allow for remote control of the safety status of weapons by built-in sensors. Another major benefit for NATO is that there is no external sign that weapons are being loaded or deployed. Formerly weapons were kept in “igloo” locations – sometimes off airsites - from where protesters (and spy satellites) could see deployment movements.
The current construction program for these new weapon storage systems totals 208 vaults on 13 airbases. Since each vault probably holds one weapon, the new storage capacity, once completed can host 208 weapons.
U.S. Department of Defence Reveals British airbases to have nuclear weapons storage capacity.
The U.S. Air Force's Electronic Systems Center accidentally revealed a British national secret. Marham Air Base in Britain and Brueggen Air Base in Germany are two Royal Air Force airbases having the capability to store nuclear weapons. On July 18, 1995 the Hanscom Air Force Base Electronics Systems Center issued a little-noticed press release announcing the $24 million sale of 34 "Weapon Storage and Security Systems" (WS3), providing "storage of tactical nuclear weapons within the floors of hardened aircraft shelters" to Britain. The release stated that 24 vaults were installed at Marham Air Base in Britain by May 1995, and 10 more at Brueggen Air Base in Germany by June 1995.
The only U.S. airbase in Britain to have nuclear weapons storage vaults is RAF Lakenheath. It is likely that 30 vaults have been installed and reached initial operational capability on November 18, 1994. Originally, 48 vaults had been planned for this airbase. This may clarify reports in the British press that the nuclear weapons at Lakenheath might have been quietly withdrawn. They have been relocated to vaults, a much less visible storage method.
Other NATO countries have such vaults too. Germany: 101; Turkey
(Incirclik: <30). There is an issue about whether or not new NATO
members – formerly in the Eastern Bloc – will eventually have nuclear vaults
too.
The vaults, which have remotely controlled “weapon safety” are manufactured
by Bechtel National Inc (US) and Mannesmann Anlagenbau, Duesseldorf.
What weapons might the vaults contain?
The weapon of choice is the B61 or B61-10 (free fall bomb) made from a converted Pershing-II warhead. The B61-11 is an earth-penetrating weapon (as were some of the Pershing-II weapons). So, while the Pershings left long ago, some of their warheads still remain.
This article was compiled using information partly supplied from
a BASIC-BITS Research Note February 1997.
NATO deployment information via BASIC: supplied to the Berlin Information-center
for Transatlantic Security (BITS) and the British American Security Information
Council (BASIC) by the U.S. Department of Defense. The BASIC web site http://www.basicint.org/
gives useful linked sites across this topic.
The Abolition 2000 campaign covers campaign work to reduce or remove nuclear weapons. Their web-site, http://www.napf.org/abolition2000 (hosted by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation) gives a wide range of information about 3,500 citizen action groups around the world.
Something which struck my eye was the New Agenda Coalition which calls (amongst other things) for US and Russia to bring START-II into force without delay and to commence START-III. For nuclear weapon states to commence de-alerting nuclear weapons as an interim measure; to remove warheads from delivery vehicles.
The New Agenda Motion was passed by the UN First Committee, Friday 13th November 1998. US, UK and France, Russia, India, Pakistan, Israel, Turkey voted against. Japan and China abstained along with 12 other NATO states. Canada and Germany demand that NATO adopt a no-first-use policy. This unusual motion highlights substantial division within NATO on nuclear policy and strategy despite intense internal lobbying from the "older" nuclear states for the current situation.
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