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Stuart Parkinson, Director of SGR, opened the conference with a few words on the relevance of the conference theme in the context of ongoing world events.
Frank Barnaby then spoke on "the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism". Dr Barnaby is a nuclear physicist, a former Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences and currently works for the Oxford Research Group. Dr Barnaby suggested that, given the evident difficulties in effectively using biological and chemical weapons (e.g. nerve agents in Japan, anthrax in the USA), terrorists are more likely to attempt nuclear attacks. He then went through possible scenarios for terrorist use of nuclear and radiological weapons. These included detonating a primitive home-made nuclear explosive device or stolen military nuclear weapon, attacking a nuclear reactor or reprocessing plant, attacking nuclear material in transit, and detonating a radiological weapon ("dirty bomb"). In one example, Dr Barnaby discussed the possible effects of an attack on the high level waste tanks at Sellafield. Each tank of the 14 active tanks contains around 6 times the amount of Caesium-137 as was released at Chernobyl, and its dispersal could potentially result in 170,000 fatal cancers. Finally Dr Barnaby discussed steps that could be taken to counter nuclear terrorism, concluding that effective intelligence was of the greatest importance.
Questions from the floor followed, which included discussion of the risks in the UK's export of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel given its potential as a "dirty bomb" or as a source of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Export of MOX contradicts stated government policy to reduce risks from nuclear terrorism, and could be an important issue for SGR to take up. Also, worries were voiced about colluding in generating an atmosphere of public fear rather than addressing the root causes of terrorism.
John Finney, Professor of Physics at UCL and Treasurer of the British Pugwash Group (BPG), gave a talk entitled "An End to the UK's Nuclear Weapons" based on the report of the same name published by the BPG in 2002. Prof. Finney began by summarising the arguments of the 1995 BPG Report that concluded that British nuclear weapons have had no detectable influence on events and could be dispensed with. UK nuclear weapons had been of negligible use during the cold war and now they actually have a negative value - i.e. they pose an additional risk. He gave an overview of the UK nuclear weapons programme, which is based entirely on Trident. Prof. Finney discussed the prospects for multilateral disarmament, concluding that little progress can be expected at present. He then summarised possible UK policy options on nuclear weapons. From this, he concluded that a decision now not to replace Trident when its design life expires in 2020 would be a useful and realistic step forward. Prof. Finney suggested a number of additional steps the government should take including justifying warhead numbers, reducing military plutonium stockpiles, redirecting AWE Aldermaston towards arms control and verification work, and work towards a multilateral "no first use" agreement.
Questions were then taken by both Dr Barnaby and Prof. Finney. Points discussed included worries about the non-proliferation issue being moved from an arms-control and verification agenda towards a neo-conservative agenda of military interdiction, and how SGR could best contribute to progress towards nuclear disarmament. The dependence of the UK deterrent on the US was noted, as was the fact that the US was probably the only state capable of posing a real threat to UK Trident submarines on patrol. Another point was that the IAEA reports to the Security Council on proliferating states but not on states failing to honour their commitment to disarm under article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was suggested that we also need to focus on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a key arena in terms of redirecting scientific work, as well as looking at the NPT. Prof. Finney was clear that the focus of the BPG report was the NPT.
SGR AGM
Following a short break, the SGR AGM took place. Phil Webber (Acting Chair) opened the AGM with brief comments about major developments during the year. SGR now has a part time (50%) Executive Director, a part time (20%) Press Officer (Richard Scrase), and a part-time (50%) researcher (Chris Langley). The Administrator's part time post has been expanded from 40% to 50%. Following acceptance of the previous AGM, the Annual Report was presented to the meeting. In addition to internal expansion, SGR has been increasingly active in terms of conferences, lectures, website presence, media-work, lobbying and research. The importance of increasing membership in order to capitalise on and expand SGR activities was stressed, with members being asked to take away new SGR promotional material and invite new members to join. The election of the National Co-ordinating Committee took place. All those standing were elected, as follows:
Updates were then given on specific SGR activities including the ethical careers
guide and briefings, and the research project on vested interests in science
and technology. Chris Langley summarised
his progress to date on the Military
Influence project.
The conference was closed by Stuart Parkinson who thanked the all the speakers and participants for their contributions.
The main potential types of nuclear terrorist attacks will be discussed. These will include: acquiring a nuclear weapon from the arsenal of a nuclear-weapon power and detonating it; acquiring fissile material and fabricating and detonating a primitive nuclear explosive; attacking a nuclear-power station reactor; attacking the high-level radioactive waste tanks at reprocessing plants; attacking a plutonium store; and detonating a radiological weapon (dirty bomb).
Measures to effectively counter nuclear terrorism will be described. The need to improve the security of nuclear materials and the difficulties involved in doing so will be discussed. So will the importance of effective intelligence in countering nuclear terrorism.
Frank Barnaby, BSc, MSc, PhD, DSc (Hon) is a nuclear physicist by training. He worked at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston (1951-57) and was on the Senior Scientific Staff of the Medical Research Council when he was a lecturer at University College London (1957-67). He was the Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (1967-70) and Director of SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (1971-81). He was Professor at the Free University, Amsterdam (1981-85) and Visiting Professor, Stassen Chair, at the University of Minnesota (1985).
He currently works for the Oxford Research Group on research into military technology, the civil and military uses of nuclear energy and the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. He has honorary doctorates in Science from the Free University, Amsterdam and the University of Southampton.
An End to the UK's Nuclear Weapons?
The lifetime of the UK Trident nuclear weapons system - which comprises the whole of the British nuclear "deterrent" - is about a further 20 years. Procurement times suggest that a decision must be made about a possible replacement system in the next five years or so, with preliminary work starting on a replacement system by around 2010.
The UK is legally committed to nuclear disarmament under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as reaffirmed unequivocally at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. As a positive move to implementing this commitment, the UK government could decide and announce now that the UK will not acquire a nuclear replacement for Trident when its operational life expires about 20 years from now.
This action would establish a timetable in which the UK would fulfil its NPT commitment. It would confer integrity on increased UK efforts to secure multilateral nuclear disarmament, and give reality to the government's statement in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review that it aims “to take forward the process of nuclear disarmament to ensure that our security can in future be secured without nuclear weapons”.
Professor John Finney has been Professor of Physics at University College London since 1993. His research interests focus on condensed matter physics, with particular emphasis on understanding structures and interactions in liquids, in particular aqueous solutions. For the previous five years, he was seconded to the Science and Engineering Research Council at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, where he was Chief Scientist at the ISIS Facility. From 1993-96 he was Science Coordinator for the European Spallation Source Project. He was founder editor of Euroscience News from 1997-2002 and Vice President of Euroscience from 2000-2002. Currently he is Treasurer of the British Pugwash Group.
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