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This section of the web site covers the development of new weapons systems and weapons technologies and the efforts to control them. There is a clear conflict between the fact that the nuclear powers continue to fund the development of new weapons with large budgets whilst at the same time being bound by treaties to reduce them (for example the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, NPT). At present most efforts to reduce arms, limit arms or the spread of arms (for example into space) are constrained by this.
Scientists and engineers have a central role in the development of new weapons and therefore share a special responsibilty to society. SGR has done a lot of investigation into the extensive influence that the military has over science and technology, in particular our report 'Soldiers in the Laboratory', and you can find out more on the subject in our Military influence section.
A Note On “Weapons of Mass Destruction”
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Behind Closed Doors: Military influence, commercial pressures and the compromised university, launched on 12th June 2008 is the result of an in-depth investigation into 16 of Britain's universities, including some of the most prestigious. The Report uses new data obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, and builds upon the material assembled in the two previous studies of military involvement in UK universities. We estimate that the average level of military funding of UK universities is up to five times higher than government figures suggest. The report also reveals the pervasive extent of the military influence in UK universities, which raises significant disquiet among some university staff to whom we spoke about the growing presence of military and commercial influences on campus and their effect on the research agenda. The report highlights how, since 2002, new military research groups have sprung up in universities, supported by publicly-funded research councils, military corporations and the Ministry of Defence. The growth in the number of such groups has been accelerated by the UK 2006 Defence Technology Strategy. |
Could one Trident submarine cause 'nuclear
winter'?
Philip Webber analyses the latest research on the potential climatic impacts
of nuclear war and demonstrates that the firepower of just one of the UK's Trident
submarines could be devastating for the whole planet. (February)
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More Soldiers in the laboratory: the militarisation of science and technology - an update, (Aug 2007), provides an update to Soldiers In The Laboratory (published in 2005, downloadable through our Military Influence section). In addition to SGR's latest findings about the power and influence of the military in science, engineering and technology (SET) in the UK and elsewhere since the previous report was written, this briefing also highlights some of the problems encountered in obtaining detailed information on military involvement in R&D despite the entry into force of the Freedom of Information Act. The report also documents the huge imbalance between government R&D funding of the military and funding to tackle ill-health, environmental degradation and poverty, and argues that a major shift in resources towards supporting social justice and environmental protection and away from the military is needed. |
'SGR argues that the UK should not replace
its Trident nuclear weapons system in a submission
to the House of Commons Defence Committee (publicly released: 7 March 2007)
The
costs of replacing Trident - article by Dr Stuart Parkinson in
the Institute of Physics magazine, 'Physics World' (March 2007)
Delay
the decision on Trident replacement - letter to the Guardian, co-signed
by SGR, (March 2nd 2007)
Guns
and Global Warming: War, Peace and the Environment Web version of a
presentation given by Dr Stuart Parkinson, SGR, at the Network for Peace AGM,
London (10 February 2007)
Keeping nuclear weapons or tackling climate change?
- Web version of a Presentation to a parliamentary seminar. The presentation
uses government and industry data to carry out a new analysis of the degree
to which Trident replacement could undermine action on climate change. It concludes
there is significant threat - due to competition for both funding and skills.
(December)
Web version of a Submission
to a recent Defence Select Committee inquiry which examines the
effect that opting for replacement of the UK's nuclear weapons could have on
the national skills base. It concludes that such a path could have a significant
and detrimental impact on the supply of science and technology staff to the
civilian sector. In particular, it expresses concern that this problem could
seriously undermine the UK's attempts to play its role in tackling global issues
such as climate change and energy insecurity. (November)
Missile Defence - general implications of UK involvement
in the project - Web version of a presentation given by Dr Stuart Parkinson,
SGR, for "Missile Defence and the Weaponisation of Space: Why Britain's role
must be challenged", House of Commons, (October)
Web version of a Letter to the Parliamentary Labour Party concerning its discussion of a motion on Trident. This action was requested at the SGR conference and the PLP discussion meeting took place on 31st October 2005.
Call to Reed Elsevier to end its international promotion of the arms trade - Web version of a letter (with SGR as co-signatories) published in the Lancet, (10th September 2005)
Soldiers in the Laboratory: military involvement in science and technology and some alternatives’ - (19th January 2005) an extensive investigation of the current situation, with detailed recommendations for reform. For further information about this report (and how to download it), see our Military Influence section.
SGR comments on proposals for new UK sustainable development strategy - (31st July 2004) In these Responses to the Government’s consultation on its Sustainable Development Strategy we advocate switching much of the large Ministry of Defence science and technology budget to areas with a specific environmental/ social focus.
Thinking around Missile Defense - Powerpoint presentation given by SGR Chair, Dr Philip Webber, to the “Missile Defence - Threats, Responses and Projections” Conference held at the University of Bradford. The conference was co-hosted by British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and Bradford Department of Peace Studies. This presentation is available from our Downloads Page (18th March 2004)
The Environmental Dimensions of the ‘War on Terror’ - Lecture for CCE seminar ‘The War on Terror’, Sussex University by Dr Stuart Parkinson, SGR (5th July, 2003)
Why the war on Iraq is a warning for the planet - SGR presents an analysis of the underlying policies and strategies which have led to the Iraq war and discusses its possible impacts (PDF version available from our Downloads Page) (12th April 2003)
British Defence Minister Geoff Hoon announced in the House of Commons, January 15th 2003, that he had come to the "preliminary conclusion" that Britain should allow the US to incorporate the early warning radar station at Fylingdales, North Yorkshire, into America's proposed missile defence (MD) network. This effectively means that Britain will join the US in breaching the outer space treaty since it would require the "militarisation of space". SGR has issued a Press Release (17th January 2003) and submitted more detailed arguments against UK involvement in MD plans as evidence to the House of Commons' Select Committee on Defence. SGR is a member of the Missile Defence Working Group (MDWG) which opposes MD and which has recently produced a leaflet "NO to Missile Defence" (PDF version available for download). NB. Paper copies of this leaflet can be obtained free of charge by emailing us or writing to the SGR Office.
In a Press Release dated October 2nd SGR stated its opposition to possible military action by the USA and UK against Iraq, and called for greater efforts by those countries to find a peaceful solution through the UN.
An End to the UK’s Nuclear Weapons (NL28, November 2003)
Does anybody remember the Nuclear Winter? (NL27, July 2003)
The US-Russian Nuclear Arms Treaty (NL25, August 2002)
Nuclear Threats Against Iraq (NL25, August 2002)
US Policy Responsible for Nuclear Proliferation (NL24, March 2002)
Star Wars - The Next Generation: The Space Based Laser (NL23, July 2001)
SGR - Star Wars - Space Control and Domination (NL23, July 2001)
Slight Lifting of Israel's Nuclear Secrecy (NL22, February 2001)
India's Nuclear Doctrine - the Responsibility of the Other Nuclear States (NL22, February 2001)
Nuclear arms reductions; a glimmer of hope? (NL20, Spring 2000)
Global Nuclear Stockpiles - how many are there? (NL19, Summer 1999)
SGR Newsletter NL19: Special Issue on Nuclear Issues (Summer 1999)
This term has now been used by the US and UK administrations in a loose way - particularly in relation to the invasion of Iraq - to cover nuclear, chemical and biological warheads in rockets or artillery shells.
Strictly speaking, a “weapon of mass destruction” is a weapon that is capable of being deployed against a target such as a town or city which, when used, would create widespread indiscriminate destruction. For example, a nuclear bomb on a plane able to drop it over such a target or a missile carrying such a warhead with sufficient range fits this definition. A chemical weapon does not meet this description as it is very difficult to use and would not cause widespread destruction. A biological weapon, whilst it might cause significant casualties, again would not cause widespread destruction. The use of chemical and biological weapons, along with nuclear weapons, is illegal and conflicts with the accepted conventions and laws of war.
Chemical, biological and nuclear weapons require maintenance if they are to stay viable weapons. In a chemical “binary” weapon the two “precurser” components that, once mixed, make the poisonous chemical can be unstable in storage. Biological weapons are extremely hard to “weaponise” - for example into freeze dried small particles that will float in the air. Biological materials are extremely unstable and cannot be kept for long periods. Nuclear fission weapons require regular tritium “top ups”.
Nevertheless, any reasonably developed country with a chemical industry or a brewing industry is technically capable of making a chemical or biological weapon. Such technology is widespread, relatively easily avaialble and does not take up much space.
Nuclear facilities on the other hand are enormous, extremely costly and highly detectable by satellite surveillance or overfly sensors. Weapons delivery systems for all three types of weapon are also extremely easy to detect. A rocket launch causes a huge plume of hot gas easily detectable from a satellite and the rocket trajectory can be monitored in close detail enabling the range and “payload” to be calculated.
What this means is that one component of a potential “weapon of mass destruction”, the launch system, is highly visible and can be monitored. Nuclear weapons are also very difficult to hide. Actually testing a nuclear weapon is something that cannot be hidden.
In the Iraq case, to call chemical warheads based on artillery shells which did not have the range to hit any major target “weapons of mass destruction” was extremely misleading. Worse, the warheads and the materials to mix into them on the battlefield did not in fact exist in 2002, having been effectively removed by years of monitoring and sanctions.
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