SGR Statement on Kyoto Mechanisms (Oct 2000)
At the 6th Conference of the Parties (COP-6) to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change [1], to take place in The Hague from 13th
-24th November, 2000, decisions will be made on the operating conditions
of the three 'Kyoto Mechanisms':
-
Emissions Trading (ET, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol [2]);
-
Joint Implementation (JI, Article 6); and
-
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, Article 12).
The operation of these economic instruments is based on the idea that a
'donor' country with a target for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases
may find it cheaper to invest in measures in a 'host' country (in either
a transition economy or a developing country).
As such, these instruments have mainly been justified in terms of their
ability to contribute to economic efficiency. However, economic instruments
like these have never before been used in the implementation of a multi-lateral
environmental agreement. Hence, there are many unresolved issues in their
management and use. Further, there are concerns that the industrialised
nations may exploit these measures at the expense of the global climate
and the relatively poor developing countries.
Consequently, SGR believes that the rules governing their use must be
robust; and caution must be exercised in their use. In practical terms,
this leads to the following recommendations:
-
Strict limits on the 3 trading mechanisms. There are two
main reasons why the Kyoto Mechanisms may not contribute to preventing
dangerous climate change. The first is that it is very difficult to ensure
that there will not be loopholes in their operation. One such loophole
is the existence of 'hot air', ie the targets for certain countries (eg
Russia) are so lax that they will be able to sell 'permits' under Emissions
Trading without taking any emissions reduction action themselves. The second
reason is that the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms is likely to shift attention
away from significant action domestically within the industrialised countries,
which is essential to tackle climate change in the long term. This is given
further credence by the fact that emissions per capita in the industrialised
countries are much higher than those in developing countries, and hence
the trading measures could be used to perpetrate further global inequality.
Hence, SGR believes that strict limits on the use of these mechanisms is
necessary, and supports the EU proposal for defining criteria for this
[3].
-
No nuclear fission projects in JI or the CDM. Nuclear fission
power plants can contribute to both the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and the spread of nuclear waste problems, which are currently unresolved
even in western countries. SGR therefore believes that neither JI nor the
CDM should be used for the export of nuclear fission technology.
-
Tight restrictions on forestry projects in JI and the CDM.
There are many uncertainties concerning the ability of forest ecosystems
to store CO2. Further, CO2 stored in this way can be released in the future
due to, eg, forest die-back [4]. On the other hand, deforestation in many
parts of the world is proceeding at a very rapid rate, leading not only
to CO2 emissions, but also to other environmental problems such as loss
of wildlife biodiversity, soil erosion, and flooding. Hence, SGR believes
that some benefit can be gained by the inclusion of forestry in JI and
the CDM, but that it should be strictly controlled to prevent loopholes
becoming significant or negative local impacts occurring. To do this would
require that:
-
no more than a few percent of any donor country's emissions reduction activities
should include forestry;
-
only projects with unambiguous emissions reduction potential should be
accepted.
-
clear local social and environmental benefits should be demonstrated before
any such project is approved.
-
No 'climate-engineering' projects in JI or the CDM. SGR believes
that projects involving speculative 'climate engineering' technologies
(eg deep ocean carbon storage or pumping, iron fertilisation of the oceans
or the injection of reflective material into the upper atmosphere) should
under no circumstances be accepted because of their potential for unpredictable
negative effects.
-
Tight interpretation of sustainable development criterion.
As stated in the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM must assist the developing countries
in which it operates 'in achieving sustainable development'. There is,
as yet, no clear indication of what this means. SGR believes that clear
minimum standards need to be agreed so that this criterion is not merely
fudged, allowing projects with negative or inequitable local social and
environmental effects to be funded. Further, SGR believes that similar
standards should be agreed by recipient countries under JI so that this
limitation does not act as a disincentive to carrying out CDM projects.
Notes
1. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was agreed at the Earth
Summit in 1992 with the main aim of 'preventing dangerous anthropogenic
(ie human) interference with the global climate system'. The Convention
has now been ratified by 186 countries.
2. The three 'Kyoto Mechanisms' were agreed as part of the Kyoto Protocol
in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol set legally binding targets for the industrialised
countries to reduce their combined emissions to at least 5% below their
1990 levels. Each country was given an individual target which it can meet
by domestic action and use of the Kyoto Mechanisms.
3. The EU proposal on 'supplementarity' (limits on trading) uses a
formula to calculate the percentage of the emissions reduction that a given
country is allowed to 'sell' to other countries. The algorithm uses factors
such as population and GNP and results in a figure which is roughly 50%
of the total emissions reduction.
4. According to the latest report on Climate Change by the UK Hadley
Centre, there is a real danger of the large-scale death of forests by the
middle of this century due to changes in the climate.