The UK government has announced a new nuclear role for the Royal Air Force using US bombs and aircraft. Dr Philip Webber, SGR, explores the disturbing implications of this surprise announcement.

Article from Responsible Science journal no. 8 (2026). Advance online publication 7 October 2025.

On 25th June, at NATO's 2025 summit in The Hague, Netherlands, the UK prime minister revealed plans to purchase US war planes designed to carry the US B61 nuclear bomb. The government statement was unusually explicit: “The UK will purchase 12 new F-35A fighter jets and join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission in a major boost for national security.” [1]  

The move amounts to a significant expansion of the UK's nuclear programme, taking it beyond its submarine-based weapons to include air-dropped weapons for the first time in more than two decades.
 

What is NATO’s ‘dual capable’ aircraft nuclear mission?

‘Dual capable’ refers to specific, nuclear certified aircraft – including the US F-35A – that can be used both for conventional military roles and also to carry the US B61 nuclear glide bomb [2].

According to a NATO factsheet [3]: “If NATO was to conduct a nuclear mission in a conflict [i.e. drop nuclear bombs], the B61 weapons would be carried by certified Allied aircraft, known as dual capable aircraft (DCA), and supported by conventional forces from across the Alliance.”
 

Does the UK have the nuclear weapons required for this mission?

About 100 US B61 nuclear weapons are currently stored in nuclear vaults across six airbases in Italy, Germany, Turkey, the Netherlands and Belgium [4].

In 2024, a US Department of Defense financial allocation included spending to upgrade Lakenheath airbase in Suffolk in order to accommodate nuclear weapons personnel. The UK government has refused to comment on this.

Then, in July 2025, close observers of air traffic movements tracked US C-17 cargo planes leaving the US Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center in New Mexico and landing at Lakenheath, under unusually high security, close to large hangars known to house secure, underground, nuclear drop bomb storage vaults. They concluded that, for the first time in 20 years, Lakenheath was again hosting US nuclear weapons [5].

It is not known why the US (under the Biden presidency) took the decision to deploy these new nuclear weapons in the UK; one suggestion is that it compensated for a possible removal of weapons from Turkey.

Currently the only aircraft in the UK certified to carry these nuclear weapons are the US Air Force 48th Fighter Wing's F-35As, based at Lakenheath. Crucially, these warheads do not appear to be part of a formal NATO arrangement, since as yet there are no RAF jets that could carry and drop them. However, the working assumption by groups monitoring the situation is that the US nuclear weapons may be intended for future deployment by the new RAF F-35A squadron, to be based at Marham airbase only 20 miles away.
 

What are the weapons for?

According to US and NATO doctrine, the forward-based US nuclear weapons are deployed to give NATO the option of making a ‘tactical’ or ‘limited’ nuclear strike against a military target just inside Belarus or Russian territory. Similar Russian weapons pose an equivalent threat to NATO countries. NATO threatens use of these weapons first against forces massing for attack, supposedly to deter any such attack in the first place. It appears that Russia has a similar policy: to threaten a nuclear response against attack by superior NATO forces [6].

Both NATO and Russia argue that a limited nuclear threat is more credible than the threat of using multiple longer-range ‘strategic’ weapons to devastate whole cities such as London, New York, Moscow, or Leningrad. The B61 nuclear bomb, like its Russian counterparts, can be set to a range of nuclear yields, starting as low as 0.3 kilotonnes, kT (300 tonnes of TNT equivalent) and going up to 1.5, 10, 50 and 170 kT [7]. The last two yield options are considerably larger than the 15 kT Hiroshima bomb, and similar in explosive power to a ‘strategic,’ UK Trident submarine-launched missile warhead of 100 kT. We do not know the upper option for bombs that would be supplied to the UK.
 

A strategy for winning a nuclear war?

The UK RAF press statement, released on the same day as the UK government announcement in June 2025, was strikingly belligerent: “The procurement of F-35A marks a significant step in delivering a more lethal ‘Integrated Force’, to maintain operational relevance, which deters, fights, and wins.” [8] [My emphasis.]

The five original nuclear weapons states: the USA, Russian Federation, China, France and the UK (the P5) have rejected the idea of winning a nuclear war more than once. A 2022 joint statement said: “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences … nuclear weapons — for as long as they continue to exist — should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.” [9]

But today, all nuclear parties are building and deploying new nuclear weapons, in a contradiction of this understanding.

Despite the claims, the continued deployment of short-range nuclear weapons creates one of the highest risks of nuclear conflict and escalation. The short flight to target makes any potential warning period extremely short, so in a crisis their very existence will significantly raise fears of a nuclear strike, and any side fearing an incoming nuclear strike will be under extreme pressure to launch their own nuclear weapons.

Nuclear exercises risk nuclear wars by mistake. In the 1980s a NATO nuclear practice exercise triggered a high alert status by Russian forces who thought that it was a cover for a first strike [10]. NATO continues to hold regular ‘Steadfast Noon’ exercises in which an attack by Russian forces is simulated [11]. Russia regularly conducts similar exercises with the Zapad (Запад: the West) attacking. Since the Ukraine war, however, both sides are careful to avoid conducting exercises near the border regions.

A key flaw in any plan to use short-range nuclear weapons is that the process of removing them from storage vaults and loading them on to NATO war planes or Russian launchers sends a clear signal that a nuclear strike may be imminent, setting the stage for a false warning or blunder that could be a hair trigger away from nuclear disaster.

It is not surprising that war-gaming ‘table-top’ exercises typically result in rapid nuclear escalation, more widespread use of nuclear weapons and enormous civilian casualties.
 

Implications of the UK joining the nuclear ‘mission’

In some ways, the UK's position is similar to that of many other European countries. After the invasion of Ukraine, and under severe pressure from the US, countries that border Russia are increasing their military spending and alert status, while two previously neutral countries, Finland and Sweden, have recently joined NATO. Poland says it would be prepared to host US nuclear weapons, while Finland would in a crisis. Russia has recently deployed weapons into Belarus.

But recent events highlight the irrelevance of nuclear weapons. On 9th September 2025, in response to a widespread Russian drone incursion into Polish and Romanian airspace, NATO, lacking widespread air defences, had no option but to deploy fighter jets costing in excess of $100,000,000 each, to shoot down multiple drones costing around $35,000 each [12]. On 19th September, three Russian MiG-31 aircraft — heavy interceptors capable of carrying Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missile — entered via the Gulf of Finland and circled over Estonia. Italian F-35 jets were scrambled in response. Clearly, nuclear weapons can be no credible deterrent against such threats, nor against other provocations such as electronic jamming, cyberattack or political destabilisation.

One can see why European countries want to bolster their defences in areas where NATO has previously relied upon the USA. But in my analysis, the UK purchase of nuclear capable F-35A aircraft is not about real defence or security, especially given there are already some 100 forward-based US nuclear weapons distributed across Europe.

The UK spending is instead an expensive political gesture that panders to the US by purchasing US made F-35As, dependent on regular US software upgrades and parts, rather than the European-made Typhoon plane. It also signals a commitment to dramatically increased NATO military spending in response to US pressure – despite the fact that NATO, excluding the current US contribution, already expends similar amounts to Russia [13].

Existing and new deployments of nuclear weapons in the UK and Belarus also arguably breach the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the UK, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has secured a legal opinion supporting this view [14].

In my analysis, increased security in Europe cannot be achieved by deploying yet more offensive and destructive nuclear weaponry. The existing short-range weapons could already devastate Europe, with millions of civilian casualties. What is required is much more effective – and much more cost-effective – non-nuclear defences capable of combatting air incursions such as drones and Russian fighters. Above all, there is an urgent requirement for a new nuclear forces reduction treaty to be negotiated between the USA, Russia and NATO countries [15].
 

Dr Philip Webber is Co-chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR). He has researched and written on nuclear weapons for over 40 years, including as a co-author of London After the Bomb and UK Nuclear Weapons: A Catastrophe in the Making?

Image credit: Pexels via Pixabay
 

References