Alasdair Beal takes a look at the UK nuclear industry – and finds that the proposed expansion has a workforce problem.
Responsible Science blog, 27 November 2024; updated 4 December 2024
The incoming Labour government has inherited two major nuclear programmes - new power stations and new Trident missile submarines. Both are behind schedule and over-budget but the government says it wants them to continue. This article looks at the difficulties mobilising the skilled workforces required.
Nuclear programmes off-track
In 2010, the Conservative-led government announced its aim for work to be started on eight new nuclear power stations by 2025 [1]. Plans and timetables have been repeatedly revised since then but, currently, only one is actually under construction – Hinkley Point C (HPC) in Somerset. The 2024 ‘Civil Nuclear: Roadmap to 2050’ [2] stated that the aim is now to “secure investment decisions to deliver 3-7GW [gigawatts] every five years from 2030 to 2044, to meet our ambition to deploy up to 24GW of nuclear power by 2050.” This would amount to up to eight more plants the size of HPC. Even this appears unrealistic, given the serious problems building current reactor designs [3].
The military nuclear programme is also in trouble. Recently, Vanguard class submarines – armed with Trident nuclear missiles – have three times operated sea patrols lasting over 6 months, setting new Royal Navy records [4]. These occurred because two submarines were out of service for repairs, leaving only two in seaworthy condition. Numerous other problems have also been reported, including a faulty depth gauge leading to a nuclear-armed submarine taking a potentially catastrophic “unplanned dive” [5], and a major fire in the building used to assemble new submarines [6].
Construction of the Vanguard class submarines started in 1986 and they entered service between 1993 and 1999 with a design life of 25 years, later extended by 5 years. Construction of the replacement Dreadnought class began in 2016, with the first planned to enter service in 2028. However, this has now been delayed to “the early 2030s”, [7] which will require the existing submarines to operate until they are 40 years old, i.e. 15 years longer than their original design life and 10 years beyond their extended design life.
Major skills shortages
Skills shortages could also be a problem for both projects. In 2015, a government document [8] stated that to construct five or more new power stations by 2030, decommission existing power stations, and develop new nuclear missile submarines, “the workforce must grow by 4,700 people a year over the next 6 years. Over the same period 3,900 people are expected to leave the sector, mostly due to retirement. This means that the sector must recruit 8,600 people every year.”
Since then the schedule for new power stations has been delayed but there is now also a contract to construct new SSN-AUKUS nuclear-propelled ‘attack’ submarines. According to a House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee 2023 report [9]:
“If the UK is to achieve a contribution of 24GW of nuclear power by 2050 it will need to plan for, and achieve, a massive increase in the nuclear workforce ... 50,000 full time equivalent employees would need to be recruited by 2040, even without an expansion of nuclear power ... Under a scenario which envisages 19GW of nuclear capacity by 2050 ... 180,000 workers will need to be recruited by 2050 - including an average of 7,234 recruits each year until 2028, compared to the current inflow of around 3,000 a year. Recently, vacancies in the nuclear sector are running at twice the rate of the general engineering and construction sector.”
With existing vacancies unfilled and recruitment insufficient to maintain present staff numbers, let alone those required for government expansion plans, the potential shortage of skilled staff is serious.
However, the situation is actually worse than the bare numbers suggest: those retiring will include many knowledgeable people with experience of designing and constructing previous nuclear submarines or power stations, or else of working with those who did. New recruits can fill the vacant seats but they cannot replace the loss of knowledge. Books, training courses and videos can help but in advanced engineering work nothing beats the passing on of accumulated knowledge and experience directly between generations of engineers.
Experience counts
I am a professional civil and structural engineer and after graduation I worked on long-span bridge design with the engineers who had designed and supervised construction of some of the biggest bridges in the world. I learned a lot from them - not only about stress calculations but also about the thinking required to produce a successful design. Much of this could not have been learned from courses or books.
The case of Rolls Royce in 1971 illustrates why this is important. Problems with their new RB211 jet engine had forced the company into liquidation and it had to be nationalised. To rescue the situation , the new directors had to persuade retired former senior engineers to return to work to lead the process of redesigning the engine to overcome the problems.
This issue may also be contributing to current problems at HPC. Existing UK nuclear engineers have only limited experience of Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) construction and in any case they are likely to be fully occupied decommissioning the UK’s old AGR reactors and dealing with historic nuclear waste. Therefore construction of HPC depends heavily on French expertise.
French companies have constructed 58 nuclear power stations based on the Westinghouse PWR design, the last of these being ordered in 1990. No more were ordered for 15 years until Finland ordered a power station based on the new European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) design in 2005. By then many of the engineers and other workers who constructed France’s PWRs are likely to have retired or changed occupations, making it difficult to assemble teams with the necessary knowledge and experience to build a new power station to a new design. Maybe we should not be surprised that major problems have been encountered constructing the EPRs at Olkiluoto in Finland, at Flamanville in France – each of which has taken 17 years to build [10] – and at HPC.
Similar problems may also be affecting construction of the new Dreadnought submarines. By the time these were ordered in 2016, many of the engineers with experience of designing and constructing their predecessors would have retired or be close to retirement, taking their knowledge and experience with them.
Because of the continuing problems, efforts are increasing to share resources and costs between the civilian and military nuclear programmes [11]. Rolls Royce is promoting ‘modular’ nuclear power stations with reactors similar to those used in submarines. Also the new industry recruitment website ‘DestinationNuclear.com’ abandons the old pretence that civil nuclear power is separate from the production of nuclear weapons:
“Nuclear plays a vital role in shaping the UK's future in broader ways. Nuclear power produces carbon-free electricity that lights homes, fuels businesses, and keeps the economy moving.
The impact of nuclear goes beyond power grids. The expertise within the sector plays a crucial role in ensuring the strength and effectiveness of the UK's nuclear deterrent, contributing to global peace and security. Nuclear is not just an energy source; it’s a critical part in building a secure future for the UK.”
While the claims made in this statement can be criticised on many grounds, most relevant for this article is the apparent assumption that people who are concerned about climate change are also likely to be enthusiastic about nuclear weapons – which could trigger a catastrophic ‘nuclear winter’ if used [12]. If they are, then public acknowledgement of the link between the civil and military nuclear programmes is a clever move and will boost recruitment. However, if they are not, this strategy could backfire badly.
Time for a rethink
It is time for a nuclear reality check.
In 1994, the UK had 16 functioning nuclear power stations (total capacity 12.7GW) but in 2024 there were only 5 (total capacity 5.9GW) and after March 2030 there will be just one: Sizewell B (1.2GW) [13]. Completion of the HPC first unit (1.6GW) is now expected between 2029 and 2031, with its second unit following some years later [14]. When the effects of potential skills shortages are considered alongside the problems of current nuclear reactor designs, the idea of achieving anything like 24GW capacity by 2050 seems like a fantasy. Given the rapid growth of renewable energy and related technologies – which is set to continue – it looks likely that in future the contribution of nuclear power to UK energy supplies will be small.
Meanwhile, the programme for new Trident nuclear missile-armed submarines is a gamble based on two risky assumptions: (i) despite industry skills shortages, there will be no further delays in completing the new submarines; and (ii) the existing submarines will be able to continue operating for at least 10 years after the end of their design life. If either assumption proves incorrect then, after all the arguments over ‘unilateral’ or ‘multilateral’ nuclear disarmament, we could end up instead with a rather British outcome: ‘Unintentional Nuclear Disarmament’. At that point, the government would finally have to face up to the dangerous flaws in the idea of ‘nuclear deterrence’ and plan instead for a nuclear-free future.
The conclusion is clear: current plans for new nuclear power stations and new nuclear missile-carrying submarines should both be cancelled and the resources diverted to:
(a) reducing energy consumption and accelerating the development and deployment of alternative renewable energy supplies; and
(b) supporting international arms control and disarmament initiatives, such as the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Alasdair Beal BSc CEng FICE FIStructE is a chartered civil engineer, based in Leeds, and a former member of SGR’s National Co-ordinating Committee.
References
1. DECC (2010). Huhne highlights urgent need for new energy. Dept for Energy and Climate Change. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/huhne-highlights-urgent-need-for-new-energy
2. DESNZ (2024). Civil Nuclear: Roadmap to 2050. Dept of Energy Security and Net Zero. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-nuclear-roadmap-to-2050
3. Thomas S (2024). Nuclear power and net zero: Too little, too late, too expensive. Responsible Science, no.6. SGR. https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/nuclear-power-and-net-zero-too-little-too-late-too-expensive
4. NIS (2024a). 201 days: HMS Vengeance completes another long patrol. Nuclear Information Service. https://www.nuclearinfo.org/article/201-days-hms-vengeance-completes-another-long-patrol/
5. NIS (2023). Faulty depth gauge causes unplanned dive on Vanguard submarine. https://www.nuclearinfo.org/article/faulty-depth-gauge-causes-unplanned-dive-on-vanguard-submarine/
6. NIS (2024b). Major 15-hour fire in Barrow submarine assembly hall. https://www.nuclearinfo.org/article/major-15-hour-fire-in-barrow-submarine-assembly-hall/
7. NIS (2019). Trouble Ahead: Risks and Rising Costs in the UK Nuclear Weapons Programme. https://www.nuclearinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Trouble-Ahead-low-resolution-version.pdf
8. HM Government (2015). Sustaining Our Nuclear Skills. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415427/Sustaining_Our_Nuclear_Skills_FINAL.PDF
9. House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee (2023). Delivering nuclear power. Report HC 626. https://committees.parliament.uk/work/6864/delivering-nuclear-power/publications/
10. Mycle Schneider Consulting (2024). The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2024. https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2024
11. Johnstone P, Stirling A (2021). Hidden military implications of ‘building back’ with new nuclear in the UK. Responsible Science, no.3. https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/hidden-military-implications-building-back-new-nuclear-uk
12. SGR (2015). UK nuclear weapons: a catastrophe in the making? https://www.sgr.org.uk/publications/uk-nuclear-weapons-catastrophe-making
13. Wikipedia (2024). List of commercial nuclear reactors: United Kingdom. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_nuclear_reactors#United_Kingdom
14. As note 2.
